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Some Common Themes
In trying to summarize the importance of the papers presented here it is good to 
go back to beginnings and to return to the keynote address by which Professor 
Nakaoka gave a start to the proceedings of the conference. The inspiration of this 
address really sprang, as he explained, from his being struck by the similarity 
between present day problems of economic development-a subject he taught in 
Mexico-and Japan's early take-off. 
     He set out presenting a sketch of what seemed to be two essences, that of 
the old precapitalist economies of Asia, on the one hand, and the European 
industrial economy on the other. He assumed, it seemed, that the two were 
incompatible, and that, if they encountered each other over what he termed a 
"frontier", a "dualistic", "hybrid" structure came into being in which at best a so-
called "traditional" and a "modern" sector led a "parallel" existence. Later, 
Professor McLeod suggested this might be too simple a model. One remembers 
the Rudolphs showing how traditional culture sometimes has in store exactly the 
elements that modernity needs to respond to nineteenth and twentieth century 
challenges.' Perhaps all ancient living traditions are rich enough to provide 
starting points for "modernization" if they select, rediscover, or if need be 
reconstruct their immense heritages. 
     Towards the end of his paper, Professor Nakaoka had apparently largely 
overcome this dichotomy between traditional and modern. By then he was 
supporting a theory of proto-industrialization, which of course meant a shift of 
focus from the Meiji to the late Tokugawa period, i.e. before any proper industrial 
revolution could have taken place in Japan, and when there could have been no 
dualistic economy or any frontier between two modes of production. He did not, 
however, define the concept of proto-industrialization, but suggested a number of 
other questions, all of an economic-historical character.
' Lloyd I. Rudolph & Susanne Hoeber Rudolph The Modernity of Tradition: Political Development 
  in India (Chicago & London 1967).
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     However, turning again to the main body of his paper in search of elements 
of Japan's early modern proto-industrialized social structure, one is struck by the 
degree to which the author stressed the role of the agents of Japan's development: 
the han (or clans), the samurai and the early bureaucrats and entrepreneurs. They 
educated themselves and took the lead to provide Japan with a modern 
infrastructure, materially as well as cognitively. It was the Japanese "traditional" 
elite which transferred science and technology to the country and which started a 
process of relentless learning and development. Modernity was not the opposite 
of tradition but largely emerged from it. 
     A crucial element, therefore, emerged here, right at the beginning of the 
conference: that of the Asian demand and its agency. Whereas in many other 
papers it would apparently be assumed that the transfer of science and technology 
was a subject naturally to be looked at from the Western, supply side, here non-
Western initiative and selection was the crucial force. The process of learning 
moved forward unremittingly in Japan, trial and error playing an important part; 
the material and epistemological infrastructure of the country went on increasing, 
and in the process the distinction of what originally was Chinese, Western or 
"traditional" was soon lost
, if such labels of origin ever had any meaning for the 
analysis of development, which is probably doubtful. 
      One wonders, however, whether not some more crucial elements should 
be added to the story of Tokugawa and Meiji technological and infrastructural 
growth. Why could the Japanese traditional and competitive elite achieve as much 
as it did? Dr. Zurndorfer talked about a Chinese public sphere of which the public 
spirit of the gentry was a central component. Such a "public spirited" gentry must 
also have been central in late feudalism in Japan. In the discussion about parks 
sparked off by Professor Shirahata's paper, the theme of a public sphere or space 
came up again, this time in a non-figurative sense. Figuratively speaking, the legal 
culture of feudalism with its relative predictability of relationships and emphasis 
on the importance of contracts and mutual expectations must have provided a 
public world characterized at once by perspicacity and a degree of security. Early 
modern Japan, in other words, seems to have had at its disposal the social or legal 
technology or epistemes that are absolutely necessary for agents to take risks, 
whether financial, contractual, commercial or otherwise. These features, I suggest, 
must also have been at the basis of Professor Nakaoka's proto-industrialization, 
and they must have been among the leading factors in the early stages of renewed 
economic growth. Moreover, they represented forces that survived the abolition of 
feudalism, strictly speaking. To the Japanese, the world around them must have 
been predictable to a larger degree than was the case elsewhere in Asia, including 
China; here, in Japan, it paid to invest in education and, more generally, in longer
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term projects, which in its turn meant that science and technology was more easily 
acquired, preserved, transferred and applied with a reasonable expectancy of 
result. Just as economists speak of the degree of perspicacity of the market, one 
can think in terms of the perspicacity of social and legal relationships or of 
politics. Japan, from an early date, rated high on such a scale. In putting it like 
this, I realize that I have stretched the concept of the transfer of scientific 
knowledge and technological design to include their acquisition, preservation, 
teaching and application, but I think that doing so is in line with what emerged 
from the discussions during the conference. 
     As Professor Satofuka showed, the Japanese elite remained in firm control 
of the process, also ideologically, but at the same time the feeling of public 
responsibility and security filtered down to the level of the village community 
where initiatives to acquire and diffuse knowledge were also taken. 
     As Mr. Tsukahara's paper showed, there are many connections between 
knowledge and power, between science and technology on the one hand and the 
economy on the other. In this respect, the very precise analysis of Dr. Thee, though 
at first sight it was out of focus because it dealt with recent matters far beyond the 
time frame set for the conference, may well have provided a heuristic tool for the 
analysis of cases of such a nature as described by Mr. Wang and Mrs. Zhang for 
China. The distinctions Thee makes are subtle, it is true, but his concept of 
"technological capability"-the ability to make effective use of technology-might 
have raised some doubts about the ultimate success of the technology transfer in 
the early Fujian Ship Management Office as described by these authors. Dr. Thee 
drew attention to the importance of the intricacies of technological reception as 
well as to the falseness of a concept "transfer of technology" if understood out of 
context and as simple, one-sided supply. 
     Dr. Zurndorfer, in line with this, added to our consciousness of the 
complexity of the subject by showing the importance of analyzing each case in its 
specific local conditions, and by drawing attention to the interplay and mutual 
borrowings between old and new technologies. There will be no transfer, as was 
later reemphasized by Dr. Daniels, without a demand for, or a niche for, any 
technological innovation in any existing system. Even more important than the 
Ch'ing governments that get all the blame in the papers by Luo, Wang and Zhang, 
were the gentry, whose ingrained respect for a legally dependable public sphere 
seems comparable to the familiarity of the Japanese elite with a similar tradition, 
even though conditions were widely different in parts of China. The scope of such 
an analysis may be widened by taking in other-rising, risen, or threatened-
gentries in Asia, though the cases of China and Japan seem especially to call for 
comparison, because of the apparently similar ideology that sustained the elites of
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these countries of East Asia. There was a marvellous article by Cohen among the 
papers of the first conference that might have been of help here.2 
     Indeed, the history of the transfer of science and technology is an exercise 
in social as well as intellectual history. One of the issues to be taken up by future 
conferences could be the comparative role of gentries and the emergence of a civil 
elite society in China, Japan and the Ottoman empire. These empires seem to me 
to have tended for several decades, with very different results to be sure, towards 
the emergence of a relatively secure early modern public domain with all that this 
meant in terms of the public accountability of their leaderships and the legal 
technology indispensable for the investment in major physical technologies. Such 
an approach would fit in the category of issues that was characterized by 
Professor MacLeod, on a suggestion from Mr. De Moor, as the contextual, or 
software, infrastructural line of analysis. Professor Om Prakash also stressed the 
importance of historical context, as of course, did Dr. Zurndorfer stressing its local 
forms. One wonders whether Dr. Broeze, if such contacts would be analyzed more 
closely, would still stick to his argument that in 1880 very few predictions could 
have been ventured about the respective outcomes of Chinese and Japanese 
maritime efforts because "objectively" they must have looked very similar. 
     Another issue that could be treated by historians, emerged during the 
second day of the conference, when, very roughly speaking, the emphasis of the 
discussions shifted from development economics towards Asian and European 
access to technology. This was accompanied, sometimes perhaps rather loosely, 
sometimes in a more carefully considered way (as in the case of Professor 
Sonoda's remarks) by the observation that in the last analysis "it is all psychology 
and culture". In the same vein, Dr. Blusse called attention to culturally defined 
cognitive structures or "thought systems". This is a theme that is obviously 
crucial. During the first conference a marvellous paper by Professor Yoshida on 
the translation problems between the neo-confucian idea of ch'i and the natural 
philosophy of Europe had done justice to it.3 But what about the equivalent of 
yogaku in other parts of Asia and Africa? Such an approach could take up an issue 
touched upon by Dr. De Moor but left for further analysis by him. He explained 
the psychologically, i.e. cognitively, disconcerting effects of new weaponry in the 
nineteenth century on the profession of infantry officers and on cavalry men in the 
West. Yet one wonders about cultural or psychological effects on Indonesians who 
after having felt the impact of the new arms, used these same weapons against the
2 H. Floris Cohen 'The Emergence of Early Modern Science in Europe', in W. G. J. Remmelink, 
   ed. Journal of the Japan-Netherlands Institute III (Tokyo 1991) 9-31. 
3 Yoshida Tadashi 'The Encounter of the Ch'i World View with Western Physical Sciences', in 
   idem, 113-24.
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Dutch. Did they cope better than their European adversaries? We are told, it is 
true, that the cause of ultimate Indonesian defeats must be sought in political 
fragmentation, but Dr. Davids in last year's conference had told us that, at least in 
Europe, political diversity must be considered to favour technological progress .4 
My own research into wars in South Asia also suggests the radically increased 
indispensability of the unswerving loyalty of junior officers as a result of changing 
infantry arms and tactics. But it also suggests that this appeal could not be met by 
a society for which war was always about negotiated settlements and changing 
loyalties rather than fixed loyalties to firmly legitimate territorial states. South 
Asia, in this instance, presents a case of incompatible discourses or, if you wish, 
"thought systems", similar to the clash so bravely faced and in a way won by 
Shizuki Tadao, as described in Yoshida's ch'i paper just mentioned. 
     If any problem is central to the theme of transfer of science and technology, 
it is this epistemological one, because it concerns the translation issue in the 
widest sense of the word, as well as the question of the legitimacy of one idiom in 
terms of another. I should not leave off here without paying tribute again to 
Satofuka, who set out to describe how the Japanese ruling elite "consciously 
selected only those elements of Western management" that would carry sufficient 
Japanese legitimacy, thus maintaining its power against the onslaught of a foreign 
"thought system". 
     At first sight, other papers, presented during the third day of the 
conference, may seem to resume issues already touched upon by other authors. 
Ruskanda on the sugar industry in a way corroborated what Broeze had said 
about the shipyards of Hongkong and Singapore: that they were isolated cases of 
rather advanced technology in a sea of traditional methods and enterprise. The 
Java sugar industry, indeed, was typical of the dual technology of Indonesia at 
that time. Horio's paper on agricultural technology as instanced in the spread of 
the modern short-sole plough was again a case, not of a one-way transfer, but of a 
balanced interplay between challenges from outside and inventiveness on the part 
of indigenous producers, in this case agriculturalists. Shirahata's work raised 
many questions such as: what have Japanese gardeners, with their extreme 
emphasis on composure and order (though not in a geometrical sense) in common 
with the European classicist gardeners' abhorrence of chaos? If the European 
public parks can be seen as the upper classes' attempt to give a gust of fresh air to 
the common people and domesticate them in the process, should Japanese parks, 
also laid out during a period of the reassertion of elite power, be interpreted in a 
similar vein? The papers of Professor Deepak Kumar and Mrs. Zhang again called
4 Karel Davids 'Technological Change in Early Modern Europe (1500-1780)', in idem, 32-44.
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attention to the channels through which science and technology came to India and 
China, whether these were an educational system or a shipyard. Both authors in 
the last analysis take a political view of what from its nature might have been 
approached as a cognitive exercise. The British colonial and the Ch'ing political 
thought systems, one might say, are held responsible for a failure to achieve what 
elsewhere is achieved by the synergy of a host of factors. 
     Yet, these papers, on second thought, do not simply resume issues already 
touched upon by others. They all wrestle with the question: "Who actually, in the 
different cases examined, is in control of the transfer of science and technology 
and of a changing educational system, financially, politically and intellectually?" 
Of course it is not always the metropolitan government in the case of the colonies; 
nor is it always the gentry and the commercial classes in non-occupied countries. 
The question of the infrastructure of, and control over, research, development and 
education in the fields of science and technology deserves more attention from a 
comparative angle. This is again a question of the context in which science and 
technology are acquired, preserved, transferred and put to use, and this is a third 
field of research that might well be central to historical enquiry in the future, 
together with the issues of the emergence of a civil elite society in which it made 
sense to the agents to act on expectations of the near and middle-range future, and 
the question of epistemological transfer and translation.
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